As both love and anger are intense forms of sthenic emotion, correlated in their nature and manifestations, both seek their object, or purpose, with equal intensity; and for the law to discriminate between them, in adjudging criminal intent, and liability, is quite frequently a matter involving very clear physiological and psychical perception. Thus, while lust frequently impels to crime, it can be easily shown that crime sometimes impels to lust. Schultz records a remarkable case of a man, aged twenty-eight, who was totally incapable of intercourse with his wife until he had worked himself into a fit of artificial or natural anger;' and there are states of supreme psychical exaltation, the religious one, for instance, where there seems to be an involvement of the entire psycho-motor sphere, and where nene but the expert physician is capable of determining the precise degree of crime, or of disease, involved.
The law quite properly recognizes anger as a compatible concomitant of crime; and love is, of course, equally so, in so far as crime consists in the impulse toward furibund destructiveness; equally, with its congener, amenable to punishment, if the physician cannot, in justice, throw around the unfortunate being the shield of disease, and separate his, or her, possible hyperbulia of lust, and the desire to exercise the most intense effect upon the object of sexual passion, from the equally unconscious, or involuntary, excitation of innervation, which, in anger, sometimes manifests itself in blind violence. Either condition, however, is entirely apart from that premeditated crime, which, in the process of commission, may grow into the semblance of one or both of the last named types. But it is just here that the ability to distinguish, accurately, between those terminal forms of sexual aberration which reach courts of law, instead of the sanitarium, or asylum, becomes of vital importance to the conscientious jurist.